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First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness is a translation of Edmund Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. The first part of the book was originally presented as a lecture course at the University of Göttingen in the winter semester of 1904–1905, while the second part is based on additional supplementary lectures that he gave between 1905 and 1910. In these essays and lectures, Husserl explores the terrain of consciousness in light of its temporality. He identifies two categories of temporality—retention and protention—and outlines how temporality provides the form for perception, phantasy, imagination, memory, and recollection. He demonstrates a distinction between cosmic and phenomenological time and explores the relevance of phenomenological time for the constitution of temporal objects. The ideas Husserl developed here are explored further in his Ideas and were pursued until the end of his philosophical career.
First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. It had a decisive impact on twentieth century philosophy and is one of few works to have influenced both continental and analytic philosophy. This is the first time both volumes have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Investigations in historical context and bringing out their contemporary philosophical importance. These editions include a new preface by Sir Michael Dummett.
With a new foreword by Dermot Moran 'the work here presented seeks to found a new science - though, indeed, the whole course of philosophical development since Descartes has been preparing the way for it - a science covering a new field of experience, exclusively its own, that of "Transcendental Subjectivity"' - Edmund Husserl, from the author's preface to the English Edition Widely regarded as the principal founder of phenomenology, one of the most important movements in twentieth century philosophy, Edmund Husserl's Ideas is one of his most important works and a classic of twentieth century thought. This Routledge Classics edition of the original translation by W.R. Boyce Gibson includes the introduction to the English edition written by Husserl himself in 1931. Husserl's early thought conceived of phenomenology - the general study of what appears to conscious experience - in a relatively narrow way, mainly in relation to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge. The publication of Ideas in 1913 witnessed a significant and controversial widening of Husserl's thought, changing the course of phenomenology decisively. Husserl argued that phenomenology was the study of the very nature of what it is to think, "the science of the essence of consciousness" itself. Husserl's arguments ignited a heated debate regarding the nature of consciousness and experience that has endured throughout the twentieth and continues in the present day. No understanding of twentieth century philosophy is complete without some understanding of Husserl, and his work influenced some of the great philosophers of the twentieth century, such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre.
Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. It had a decisive impact on twentieth century philosophy and is one of few works to have influenced both continental and analytic philosophy. This is the first time both volumes have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Investigations in historical context and bringing out their contemporary philosophical importance. These editions include a new preface by Sir Michael Dummett.
Der vorliegende Band enthält den Text der zweistündigen Vorlesung, die Husserl im Sommersemester 1912 unter dem Titel „Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ in Göttingen gehalten hat. Das Thema der ursprünglich als „Urteilstheorie“ angekündigten Vorlesung wurde kurzfristig geändert, da es nicht möglich sei, wie Husserl zu Beginn der Vorlesung erläutert, „eine Urteilstheorie darzustellen, ohne weitgehende Kenntnis in Betreff gewisser allgemeiner Bewusstseinsgestaltungen vorauszusetzen“. Neben einer Untersuchung von Bewusstseinsphänomenen wie „äußere und innere Wahrnehmung, Erlebnis- und Zeitbewusstsein, Erinnerung, Erwartung, Aufmerksamkeit, Erfassung, Explikation und dergleichen†liegt das Hauptaugenmerk der Vorlesung auf der Erläuterung der beiden Grundpfeiler der phänomenologischen Methode: der Wesensschau und der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Die Vorlesung vom Sommersemester 1912 diente Husserl als Vorlage bei der Niederschrift seines transzendental-phänomenologischen Hauptwerkes, der „Ideen I“ (Husserliana Bd. III/1), mit der er während der Vorlesungszeit, nämlich Ende Mai oder Anfang Juni 1912, begann. Inhaltliche Übereinstimmungen mit dem Vorlesungstext weisen der Erste Abschnitt der “Ideen I†(„Tatsache und Wesen“), der Zweite Abschnitt („Die phänomenologische Fundamentalbetrachtung“) und teilweise der Dritte Abschnitt („Zur Methodik und Problematik der reinen Phänomenologie“) auf. – Die hier erstmals veröffentlichte Vorlesung „Einleitung in die Phänomenologie“ aus dem Sommersemester 1912 bietet Forschern und Studenten interessante Einblicke in Entwicklung und Thematik von Husserls transzendentaler Phänomenologie.
First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Die ersten drei Bände der vorliegenden,vier Teilbände umfassenden Edition bieten eine umfangreiche Präsentation von Husserls deskriptiver Erforschung der intentionalen Strukturen des Bewusstseins in den drei Hauptklassen von intentionalen Akten, den Verstandes-, Gemüts- und Willensakten. Der größte Teil der wiedergegebenen Manuskripte entstand in den Jahren zwischen 1908 und 1915. Im Jahr 1925 hat Husserls Assistent Ludwig Landgrebe auf der Grundlage vieler der hier edierten Texte ein umfangreiches Typoskript mit dem Titel „Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins“ angefertigt. Husserls fragmentarischer Entwurf einer Einleitung zu diesem Typoskript wird im ersten Band der Edition wiedergegeben. Der erste Teilband enthält Manuskripte, die der deskriptiven Analyse verschiedener Weisen der Objektivation in unterschiedlichen Aktformen und Aktvollzügen des Vorstellens und Denkens wie dem thematischen Meinen, dem Aufmerken und Zuwenden, dem Explizieren und Urteilen sowie dem Stellungnehmen gewidmet sind. Husserls besonderes Interesse gilt dabei der Beziehung zwischen Rezeptivität und Spontaneität. Dieser Band ist der erste Teilband des vier Teilbände umfassenden Sets Husserliana 43. Er enthält keinen Index (erhältlich als Teilband 4).  This volume is the first part of the four-part set Husserliana 43. It does not contain the Index (available as the fourth volume of the set).
With a new foreword by Dermot Moran 'the work here presented seeks to found a new science - though, indeed, the whole course of philosophical development since Descartes has been preparing the way for it - a science covering a new field of experience, exclusively its own, that of "Transcendental Subjectivity"' - Edmund Husserl, from the author's preface to the English Edition Widely regarded as the principal founder of phenomenology, one of the most important movements in twentieth century philosophy, Edmund Husserl's Ideas is one of his most important works and a classic of twentieth century thought. This Routledge Classics edition of the original translation by W.R. Boyce Gibson includes the introduction to the English edition written by Husserl himself in 1931. Husserl's early thought conceived of phenomenology - the general study of what appears to conscious experience - in a relatively narrow way, mainly in relation to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge. The publication of Ideas in 1913 witnessed a significant and controversial widening of Husserl's thought, changing the course of phenomenology decisively. Husserl argued that phenomenology was the study of the very nature of what it is to think, "the science of the essence of consciousness" itself. Husserl's arguments ignited a heated debate regarding the nature of consciousness and experience that has endured throughout the twentieth and continues in the present day. No understanding of twentieth century philosophy is complete without some understanding of Husserl, and his work influenced some of the great philosophers of the twentieth century, such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre.
This course on logic and theory of knowledge fell exactly midway between the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1900-01 and Ideas I in 1913. It constitutes a summation and consolidation of Husserl's logico-scientific, epistemological, and epistemo-phenomenological investigations of the preceding years and an important step in the journey from the descriptivo-psychological elucidation of pure logic in the Logical Investigations to the transcendental phenomenology of the absolute consciousness of the objective correlates constituting themselves in its acts in Ideas I. In this course Husserl began developing his transcendental phenomenology as the genuine realization of what had only been realized in fragmentary form in the Logical Investigations. Husserl considered that in the courses that he gave at the University of G?ttingen he had progressed well beyond the insights of the Logical Investigations. Once he exposed the objective theoretical scaffolding needed to keep philosophers from falling into the quagmires of psychologism and skepticism, he set out on his voyage of discovery of the world of the intentional consciousness and to introduce the phenomenological analyses of knowledge that were to yield the general concepts of knowledge needed to solve the most recalcitrant problems of theory of knowledge understood as the investigation of the thorny problems involving the relationship of the subjectivity of the knower to the objectivity of what is known. This translation appears at a time when philosophers in English-speaking countries have heartily embraced the thoughts of Husserl's German contemporary Gottlob Frege and his concerns. It is replete with insights intomatters that many philosophers have been primed to appreciate out of enthusiasm for Frege's ideas. Among these are: his anti-psychologism, meaning, the foundations of mathematics, logic, science, and knowledge, his questions about sets and classes, intensions, identity, calculating with concepts, perspicuity, and even his idealism.
This book provides a short introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology by Husserl himself. Husserl highly regarded his work "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He considered this work as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity and for his theory of the life-world. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself.
The editor, Iso Kern, of the three volumes on intersubjectivity in Husserliana XIII-XV, observes that in his "Nachlass" Husserl probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one, i.e., "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911)." Husserl regarded this work (along with the 1907 "Five Lectures") as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He regarded these lectures as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, for his theory of the life-world, and for his planned "great systematic work." It contrasts favorably with several later "introductions" because, although quite brief, it has a larger scope than they do and conveys in a relatively elementary way to the students the sense of fresh new beginnings. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself. That the second part of the lectures was never written down, can be accounted for in part, because at that time Husserl was busy writing the 1911 path-breaking essay, which complements these lectures, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."
This is the first English translation of Husserliana XXIII, the volume in the critical edition of Edmund Husserl's works that gathers together a rich array of posthumous texts on representational consciousness. The lectures and sketches comprising this work make available the most profound and comprehensive Husserlian account of image consciousness. They explore phantasy in depth, and furnish nuanced accounts of perception and memory.
This is the first English translation of Husserliana XXIII, the volume in the critical edition of Edmund Husserl's works that gathers together a rich array of posthumous texts on representational consciousness. The lectures and sketches comprising Husserliana XXIII come from a period of enormous productivity and pivotal development in Husserl's philosophical life, extending from the years immediately preceding the Logical Investigations (1900-01) almost to the time of his retirement in 1928. They make available the most profound and comprehensive Husserlian account of image consciousnessa "the awareness we have when we look at a picture or see a playa "and of its relation to art and the aesthetic. They explore phantasy in depth, and furnish nuanced accounts of perception and memory. They enrich the Husserlian analysis of time consciousness and offer a fascinating picture of the sometimes tortuous paths Husserl took in his efforts to comprehend how the forms of representation are constituted and how they are related to one another and to perception. Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory should prove to be an indispensable resource for Husserlian phenomenologists and for anyone else interested in thinking about these fundamental phenomena.
In his first book, Philosophy of Arithmetic, Edmund Husserl
provides a carefully worked out account of number as a categorial
or formal feature of the objective world, and of arithmetic as a
symbolic technique for mastering the infinite field of numbers for
knowledge. It is a realist account of numbers and number relations
that interweaves them into the basic structure of the universe and
into our knowledge of reality. It provides an answer to the
question of how arithmetic applies to reality, and gives an account
of how, in general, formalized systems of symbols work in providing
access to the world. The "appendices" to this book provide some of
Husserl's subsequent discussions of how formalisms work, involving
David Hilbert's program of completeness for arithmetic.
"Completeness" is integrated into Husserl's own problematic of the
"imaginary," and allows him to move beyond the analysis of
"representations" in his understanding of the logic of mathematics.
There is no author's introduction to Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, either as published here in the first English translation or in the standard German edition, because its proper introduction is its companion volume: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. 2 The latter is the first book of Edmund Husserl's larger work: Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and is commonly referred to as Ideas I (or Ideen 1). The former is commonly called Ideen III. Between these two parts of the whole stands a third: Phenomeno 3 logical Investigations of Constitution, generally known as Ideen II. In this introduction the Roman numeral designations will be used, as well as the abbreviation PFS for the translation at hand. In many translation projects there is an initial problem of establish ing the text to be translated. That problem confronts translators of the books of Husserl's Ideas in different ways. The Ideas was written in 1912, during Husserl's years in Gottingen (1901-1916). Books I and II were extensively revised over nearly two decades and the changes were incorporated by the editors into the texts of the Husserliana editions of 1950 and 1952 respectively. Manuscripts of the various reworkings of the texts are preserved in the Husserl Archives, but for those unable to work there the only one directly available for Ideen II is the reconstructed one."
Coming from what is arguably the most productive period of Husserl's life, this volume offers the reader a first translation into English of Husserl's renowned lectures on passive synthesis', given between 1920 and 1926. These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience and to the way in which it is connected to judgments and cognition. They include an historical reflection on the crisis of contemporary thought and human spirit, provide an archaeology of experience by questioning back into sedimented layers of meaning, and sketch the genealogy of judgment in active synthesis'. Drawing upon everyday events and personal experiences, the Analyses are marked by a patient attention to the subtle emergence of sense in our lives. By advancing a phenomenology of association that treats such phenomena as bodily kinaesthesis, temporal genesis, habit, affection, attention, motivation, and the unconscious, Husserl explores the cognitive dimensions of the body in its affectively significant surroundings. An elaboration of these diverse modes of evidence and their modalizations (transcendental aesthetic), allows Husserl to trace the origin of truth up to judicative achievements (transcendental logic). Joined by several of Husserl's essays on static and genetic method, the Analyses afford a richness of description unequalled by the majority of Husserl's works available to English readers. Students of phenomenology and of Husserl's thought will find this an indispensable work.
Coming from what is arguably the most productive period of Husserl's life, this volume offers the reader a first translation into English of Husserl's renowned lectures on passive synthesis', given between 1920 and 1926. These lectures are the first extensive application of Husserl's newly developed genetic phenomenology to perceptual experience and to the way in which it is connected to judgments and cognition. They include an historical reflection on the crisis of contemporary thought and human spirit, provide an archaeology of experience by questioning back into sedimented layers of meaning, and sketch the genealogy of judgment in active synthesis'. Drawing upon everyday events and personal experiences, the Analyses are marked by a patient attention to the subtle emergence of sense in our lives. By advancing a phenomenology of association that treats such phenomena as bodily kinaesthesis, temporal genesis, habit, affection, attention, motivation, and the unconscious, Husserl explores the cognitive dimensions of the body in its affectively significant surroundings. An elaboration of these diverse modes of evidence and their modalizations (transcendental aesthetic), allows Husserl to trace the origin of truth up to judicative achievements (transcendental logic). Joined by several of Husserl's essays on static and genetic method, the Analyses afford a richness of description unequalled by the majority of Husserl's works available to English readers. Students of phenomenology and of Husserl's thought will find this an indispensable work.
3 same lecture he characterizes the phenomenology of knowledge, more specifically, as the "theory of the essence of the pure phenomenon of knowing" (see below, p. 36). Such a phenomenology would advance the "critique of knowledge," in which the problem of knowledge is clearly formulated and the possibility of knowledge rigorously secured. It is important to realize, however, that in these lectures Husserl will not enact, pursue, or develop a phenomenological critique of knowledge, even though he opens with a trenchant statement of the problem of knowledge that such a critique would solve. Rather, he seeks here only to secure the possibility of a phe nomenological critique of knowledge; that is, he attempts to secure the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge, not the possibil ity of knowledge in general (see below, pp. 37-39). Thus the work before us is not phenomenological in the straightforward sense, but pre phenomenological: it sets out to identify and satisfy the epistemic require ments of the phenomenological critique of knowledge, not to carry out that critique itself. To keep these two levels of theoretical inquiry distinct, I will call the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of knowledge the "critical level"; the level that deals with the problem of the possibility of the knowledge of the possibility of knowledge the "meta-criticallevel."
In this fresh translation of five lectures delivered in 1907 at the University of Goettingen, Edmund Husserl lays out the philosophical problem of knowledge, indicates the requirements for its solution, and for the first time introduces the phenomenological method of reduction. For those interested in the genesis and development of Husserl's phenomenology, this text affords a unique glimpse into the epistemological motivation of his work, his concept of intentionality, and the formation of central phenomenological concepts that will later go by the names of `transcendental consciousness', the `noema', and the like. As a teaching text, The Idea of Phenomenology is ideal: it is brief, it is unencumbered by the technical terminology of Husserl's later work, it bears a clear connection to the problem of knowledge as formulated in the Cartesian tradition, and it is accompanied by a translator's introduction that clearly spells out the structure, argument, and movement of the text.
Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer The materials translated in the body of this volume date from 1927 through 1931. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures were written by Edmund Hussed (with a short contribution by Martin Heideg ger) between September 1927 and April 1928, and Hussed's marginal notes to Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik were made between 1927 and 1929. The appendices to this volume contain texts from both Hussed and Heidegger, and date from 1929 through 1931. As a whole these materials not only document Hussed's thinking as he approached retirement and emeri tus status (March 31, 1928) but also shed light on the philosophical chasm that was widening at that time between Hussed and his then colleague and protege, Martin Heidegger. 1. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article Between September and early December 1927, Hussed, under contract, composed an introduction to phenomenology that was to be published in the fourteenth edition ofthe Encyclopaedia Britannica (1929). Hussed's text went through four versions (which we call Drafts A, B, C, and D) and two editorial condensations by other hands (which we call Drafts E and F). Throughout this volume those five texts as a whole are referred to as "the EB Article" or simply "the Article. " Hussed's own final version of the Article, Draft D, was never published of it appeared only in 1962." |
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